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Severance Pay Mandates:  
Firing Costs, Hiring Costs, and Firm Avoidance Behaviors
* 
 
The potentially adverse labor market effects of severance pay mandates are a continuing 
source of policy concern. In a seminal study, Lazear (1990) found that contract avoidance of 
severance pay firing costs was theoretically simple – a bonding scheme would do – but that 
empirically the labor market distortions were large. Subsequent empirical work resolved the 
apparent paradox – firing cost effects are modest even without firm avoidance activities. To 
explore why that should be so, formal measures of severance-induced firing costs and hiring 
costs are derived. Firing costs are, it turns out, systematically less than benefit generosity 
alone would imply. Moreover their interrelationship with hiring costs, often employed in 
empirical studies as a substitute measure, is complex, with co-movements varying in sign 
and magnitude across policy parameters and the economic environment. Although the 
analysis assumes a fixed benefit mandate, the cost measures are easily extended to assess 
the impact of service-linked severance benefits on age-specific employment levels. The 
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I. Introduction 
The potentially large deadweight losses of mandated severance plans have been a 
source of concern since the 1980s, when high unemployment rates lingered in Europe 
relative to the U.S.
1  Intense investigation of severance pay effects followed, stimulated in 
part by the strong, adverse link between severance pay benefits and labor market 
performance (lower employment and higher unemployment) reported in Lazear (1990).
2  
Somewhat paradoxically, Lazear demonstrated in the same paper that severance mandates 
could be undone through a simple bonding scheme.  Lazear reconciled his theory and 
empirical results with an appeal to widespread worker credit constraints, which would make 
bonding costly. 
Subsequent theoretical work deepened the mystery.  Lazear proposed to undo the 
severance mandate by paying out equivalent benefits to all workers in each period, whether 
employed or separated (for any reason).  One can also contractually neutralize severance 
(insurance) induced firing costs by converting the plan into a severance savings plan, 
essentially offering benefits for all separations, including retirement, not simply involuntary 
layoffs, Parsons (2011a).  Not only are severance savings plans a more familiar mechanism, 
essentially pensions, they have systematically lower expected costs to the firm at the time of 
hire.   
The apparent paradox has been resolved by subsequent empirical work, which 
suggests that severance insurance mandates (at current levels of benefits and enforcement) 
do not substantially distort layoffs or employment.
3  Contractual avoidance of firing cost 
distortions is unnecessary.  Widespread voluntary severance insurance plans in the U.S., 
often as generous as those mandated in OECD countries, perhaps makes this finding 
                                                 
1 Blanchard (2006) provides a review of European unemployment concerns over the last several 
decades, highlighting his own important contributions.  See also Boeri and Garibaldi (2009).  For 
general discussions of severance pay issues, see Emerson (1988), Lazear (1990), Buechtemann 
(1992). OECD (1999, 2004, 2006), and Heckman and Pagés (2004), and Holzmann, Pouget, Weber, 
and Vodopivec (2011). 
2 Vodopivec (2004) provides an introduction to the returns as well as the costs of insuring against job 
displacement. 
3 See Blau and Kahn (1999) and Boeri, Helppie, and Macis (2008) for reviews of employment 
protection effects, while Parsons (2011b) focuses on severance plan effects.   2
unsurprising, Bishow and Parsons (2004) and Parsons (2005).  However the absence of 
serious effects raises a quite different question, one that is the focus of the present paper--
why are distortions so small?  A formal model of the firm’s employment decision is 
developed and explicit measures of severance-induced firing costs and hiring costs derived 
that shed light on this question. 
The explicit firing cost measure formalizes the intuitive argument that firing costs are 
systematically less than benefit generosity because present payouts typically reduce future 
liabilities, Parsons (2011a).  Severance savings plan, for example, have no firing cost 
implications because benefit payouts induce an equal and opposite reduction in future 
liabilities.
4  Similarly severance insurance benefits reduce future liabilities to the extent the 
firm can expect to pay out benefits (or engage in costly avoidance activities) in the future if 
the worker is retained. 
Converting a severance insurance plan into a severance savings plan with zero firing 
costs requires only that the firm pay out the same separation benefits for all separations, not 
only involuntary separations (layoffs).  In the spirit of Lazear, though, this undoing does not 
leave hiring costs unaffected.  Gross hiring costs increase with the coverage of more 
separation events even as expected firing costs fall (the probability of future payouts 
conditional on retention rises).  The labor market impact of severance pay mandates 
depends on both firing costs and hiring costs and the linkage between them.  The “firing 
cost” literature is oddly casual in the empirical implementation of the concept; many studies 
simply include severance pay measures, a reduced form approach that does not distinguish 
between firing cost and hiring cost measures.
5  More recent studies focus on hiring cost 
measures of severance mandates, although often maintaining the firing cost jargon
 6 
                                                 
4 The firm may have an economic stake in when it pays its liabilities if interest accrues at nonmarket 
rates, Garibaldi and Pacelli (2003).  See also Ferrer and Riddell (2011)’s discussion of Brazil. 
5  See Parsons (2011b) for a detailed discussion of the severance mandate literature. 
6 Heckman and Pagés (2004), however, proposed a hiring cost measure for inclusion in their 
employment and unemployment equations in the spirit of the gross hiring cost measure that emerges 
here, while alerting the reader to the neglect of firing cost measures.   3
The novelty of the present paper is its focus on precise measurement of the firing 
cost and hiring cost concepts.  The formal model is in the spirit of Gavin’s unpublished 1986 
paper, major elements of which were reviewed by Emerson (1988), but is closer in structure 
to the less general model of firm employment decisions found in Pagés and Montenegro 
(2007).
7  The focus of their analysis was the redistributive effects of mandated benefits 
increasing in job tenure.  The flat rate benefit model developed below extends easily to this 
case (see Section VIII below), permitting the design of a cohort neutral severance mandate. 
The paper proceeds in the following way.  I first review severance pay structures and 
two avoidance mechanisms—(i) layoff reduction and (ii) contract conversion (to a savings 
plan).  The first avoids the full impact of firing costs through inefficient worker retention, the 
second avoids firing costs altogether, though perhaps at the expense of increased hiring 
costs.  In Section III a three-period stochastic contracting model is developed that permits 
exploration of these options.  As a benchmark, firm behavior in the absence of severance 
pay is examined in Section IV.  The impact of a severance mandate on the firm’s 
layoff/employment decisions in the absence of contractual avoidance activities is then 
derived in Section V, while optimal behavior with contractual avoidance strategies is 
considered in Section VI.  The richness and complexity of the firing cost/hiring cost interface 
are illustrated in Section VII.  Section VIII extends the fixed benefit plan to one with 
mandated benefits that increase with service (as most do), an issue raised by Pagés and 
Montenegro (2007), with some unexpected results.  Section IX concludes. 
II.  Severance Pay Mandates and Firm Avoidance Behaviors: Background 
Firing costs potentially arise whenever firms self-finance involuntary separation 
insurance; the firm may choose to keep a worker on the payroll who is paid more than her 
productivity warrants in order to avoid the severance payout (“layoff avoidance”).
8   
                                                 
7 Nickell (1978) and Bertola (1992) provide clear introductions to the underlying employment 
dynamics in a world of certainty.  Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Bertola (1990) introduce 
uncertainty.  Bertola (1999) provides a review, Blanchard (1998) an accessible discussion. 
8  Of course commercial insurers have the same immediate incentive to avoid payment of claims, but 
presumably face stronger market forces to pay appropriate claims.  See Parsons (2011c) for a more 
complete discussion of this issue.   4
Alternatively the employer may choose to redesign the employment contract in a way that 
reduces or eliminates firing costs (“contract avoidance”). 
In the absence of information and incentive problems, contract avoidance techniques 
exist, perhaps most obviously through reinsuring the risk.  Firms, especially smaller firms, 
typically reinsure benefit risks when they can, for example health insurance and life 
insurance.  This may not be especially easy in the case of involuntary separation insurance.  
Insuring against one’s own actions, much like life insurance for suicide, has obvious, if not 
insurmountable, problems that increase reinsurance costs.
9 
In this case the firm’s private information is its insider knowledge of its own demand 
and cost conditions.  Unlike temporary separation risk, which can be monitored cheaply 
through experience rating of claims behavior, permanent separations are often precipitated 
by large demand shocks and by plant closings, perhaps unique in the firm’s experience.  
Stock markets appear to be “surprised” by firm plant-closing announcements, and one could 
expect that workers and insurers are as well.
10  If firing costs are heavy and reinsurance 
prohibitively costly, the employer may find it profitable to contract around the mandate in 
other ways.  Lazear (1990) famously proposed a benefit/bonding scheme; the firing costs of 
a severance insurance mandate can be eliminated if the firm offers the worker each period 
the same payment whether she remains employed or is separated.  This payout to the 
employed could be executed through a wage premium, though a retention bonus would work 
equally well.  If workers have reasonable access to capital and the firm faces no institutional 
limits on employment payout policies, the firm can recapture the cost of this additional 
generosity in the same way it recaptures the cost of the severance payment itself, through 
an upfront bond. 
The firm need not pay out benefits to the employed as well as the separated to avoid 
firing costs, it need only pay out the same benefits to all workers sometime, for example for 
                                                 
9 Suicide is often covered by life insurance plans, but with a delay, often two years, in benefit 
eligibility.   
10 For empirical evidence of stock price effects of plant closing announcements, see Blackwell, Marr, 
and Spivey (1990), Gombola and Tsetsekos (1992), and Clinebell and Clinebell (1994).   5
all types of separations, essentially converting the plan into a severance savings plan, which 
has no firing cost implications if benefits accrue with interest.  The benefit would be paid for 
example at retirement as well as following voluntary separation.  Framing the plan in this 
way reveals that severance insurance plans function much like savings plans in some 
circumstances, with a similar implication of zero firing costs if for example workers have no 
likelihood of lifetime employment.  In assessing a severance plan, it is important to know (i) 
the precise turnover eligibility requirements for receiving severance insurance payouts, and 
(ii) the distribution of separation probabilities by type—layoff, discharge, quit, incapacity, or 
retirement.
11 
The distinction between severance insurance plans and severance savings plans will 
be critical in the discussion to follow.
12  Severance savings plans are equivalent to defined 
contribution pension plans as characterizes by 401(k) plans in the U.S. (though with no 
penalty for withdrawal at job separation prior to retirement).  They would be distinguished 
from unemployment insurance savings accounts—Topel (1990) and Feldstein and Altman 
(2007)—only in that all accumulated assets are disbursed at the time of separation without 
regard to unemployment experience.  The insurance/savings distinction is used below to 
develop more general measurement models of the firing cost and hiring cost implications of 
severance mandates. 
III.  The Basic Contracting Model
13 
Consider a contracting model with three potential employment periods—an initial 
hiring/work period (1) followed by two potential work/layoff periods (2 and 3).  These are 
followed by a retirement period (4) that will be ignored for now, but see Section VI when we 
return to the savings plan option.  Firms have a positive per period discount factor, constant 
across periods  , 0   1  
                                                 
11 A review of worker turnover concepts can be found in Parsons (1977). 
12 I use generic labels in this study.  Heckman and Pagés (2004) employ the labels “indemnity for 
dismissal” and “seniority pay” to distinguish severance insurance from severance savings. 
13 Parsons (1986), Malcomson (1999), and Salanié (2005) provide general reviews of the contracting 
literature.  Again the basic model is similar to that of Pagés and Montenegro (2007).     6
  Demand uncertainty is indexed by productivity, which is either high or low.  Denote 
worker productivity by Vi, i=H,L, where: 
          
and the corresponding probabilities by θi, i=H,L: 
    ,    0 , and          1 ,      
Assume further that the demand draws are independent across periods, although the 
discussion considers alternatives. 
We will assume that hiring occurs in the high demand period only, and that the firm 
incurs fixed recruiting and training costs (h0, h0>0).  Sufficient recruiting and training costs 
will insure lifetime (three period) contracts, though not necessarily under all demand 
conditions.  Wages are assumed fixed over the contract life at the time of hire.
14  Under 
reasonable conditions, competition in the labor market insures that
15 
        0  and        0 . 
Voluntary separations (quits) are exogenous and occur at a constant rate α, 0   
1, at the beginning of periods (2) and (3), after which the firm makes additional layoffs as 
required.  All layoffs are permanent; rehires do not occur.  Layoffs will not typically occur in 
the high demand state in this model (see however Section VIII, which considers benefits 
increasing in service) and the discussion focuses on layoff decisions in the second and third 
periods in the low demand state only. 
IV.  No Severance Pay 
Consider first the firm’s decision-making in the absence of a severance mandate.  
Solving the model by backward induction: 
Period 3 (Layoff Period 2) 
The firm will release the worker at the beginning of period 3 if the low demand state is 
realized because: 
                                                 
14  Contractual wage rigidity was a primary focus of the early employment contracting literature, Baily 
(1977), Azariadis (1975), and Rosen (1985). 
15  The variation in demand across states must exceed training and recruiting costs.  Timothy Perri 
provided me with a formal proof of this assertion, which is available upon request.   7
        0 .
16  .        (1) 
With this layoff decision rule, expected profits at the beginning of period 3 are: 
   Π     1              0         ( 2 )  
Period 2 (Layoff Period 1) 
The firm will lay off workers in period 2 in the low demand state if: 
              Π    0 , or 
             1               0 ,      (3) 
where   1              0 .  The layoff algorithm for cohort 2 (younger) workers is more 
forgiving (productivity in the low demand state must be lower to induce layoff) than for older 
workers, and for intuitive reasons.  The firm anticipates the possibility of future profits if the 
worker is retained from the fresh demand draw at the beginning of period 3.
17 
Note 1:  In the absence of severance pay, the range of conditions under which cohort 
2 workers will be laid off is less than the range of conditions under which cohort 3 
workers will be laid off as long as demand conditions are not perfectly correlated 
between periods 2 and 3. 
Because we have a special interest in layoff distortions, assume that, in the absence 
of severance benefits, layoffs will occur in the low demand state in period 2 and a 
fortiori in period 3.   Expected profits entering period 2 are then: 
   Π     1 α  θH  VH  w    δ E Π    
     1 α  θH VH  w    δ   1 α  θH           
      1 α  θH  δ   1 α  θH              (4) 
Period 1 (The Hiring Period) 
The firm will hire  workers only if expected profits are nonnegative, which is 
presumably the high demand state.  Assuming again some fixed cost of recruiting and 
training (h0), then hiring will occur if: 
   Π     VH  w    δ E Π    h    0  
     1 δ  1 α  θH    δ 1 α  θH           h    0     (5) 
                                                 
16 Equivalently expected profits under retention are less than expected profits under layoff. 
17 If the low demand state in period 2 is “permanent,” that is carries over to period 3, and the second 
period layoff criterion is identical to the final period rule:       0    8
Competition among firms will drive up wages until expected profits are zero (the “competitive 
wage”), namely: 
           
  
         H         H          (6) 
Productivity in the high demand state exceeds wages by the amortized recruiting and 
training costs.  Amortization in this case refers to the discounted sum of expected lifetime 
employment (high demand) periods. 
V.  Severance Insurance Mandate: No Contract “Undoing” 
Consider now the impact of a severance insurance mandate that requires the firm to 
pay severance B if the worker is laid off, nothing otherwise—in an economy in which the 
mandate is not contractually undone.  Much depends on whether the benefit mandate is 
sufficient to induce layoff avoidance or not.  Consider each possibility in turn. 
A.  No layoff avoidance 
If the mandated benefit is less than some critical level, it will induce no change in firm 
layoff behavior.  Proceeding by backward induction in this circumstance: 
Period 3 (Layoff Period 2) 
The firm will of course retain the worker in the good state.  The firm will lay off the worker in 
period 3 if net productivity (productivity less wages) in the low demand state falls below the 
mandated severance benefit:
18 
            .        (7) 
In this period, then, severance-induced firing costs are precisely equal to mandated benefits 
          .        (8) 
If the firm does not release the worker in this period, future severance liabilities are zero (the 
worker proceeds to normal, uncovered retirement).  Entering the period, expected profits in 
period 3 are: 
   Π     1                          (9) 
  
                                                 
18  Again this intuitive condition follows from expected profits under retention being less than expected 
profits under layoff.   9
Period 2 (Layoff Period 1) 
The firm will lay off workers in period 2 in the low demand state if: 
              Π        , or     
             1                            
Rearranging terms: 
             1                      1       .   (10) 
The left hand side of this inequality is unchanged from the no severance case, Equation (3), 
the (negative) low demand productivity net of wages plus the (positive) discounted 
probability of a better demand state in period 3. 
Second period firing costs, the negative of the right hand side, are however reduced 
in expectation, and no longer equal the mandated severance benefit (B). 
                 1         1   1       .     (11) 
The expected severance costs incurred by a layoff in the second period are not the 
mandated severance payment, but that payment adjusted to reflect the reduced likelihood 
the firm will have to pay out severance in the next period.  Firing costs are zero, for example, 
if the likelihood of layoff (and benefit payout) in the next period is one, the discount factor is 
one and there is no natural (uncovered) attrition, (α=0).  Conversely firing costs will 
approach severance benefits if the likelihood of layoff in the next period approaches zero or 
the discount factor approaches zero or the natural attrition rate approaches one. 
We will expand on the comparative statics below (Section VII), but for now note that 
the expected third period severance liability in the absence of a second period layoff is 
greater the larger the probability of a low demand state θL in the next period.  Severance 
payouts might only be postponed.  Conversely firing costs rise with the rise in the voluntary 
attrition rate α, which reduces the likelihood of future severance payouts if retained today.   
Summarizing:  
Proposition 1:  Firing costs for cohort 2 workers are systematically less than 
severance benefits unless there is zero voluntary attrition and the probability of layoff 
in the next period is one and the discount factor is one.   10
If layoffs still occur in the second (and third) period in the low productivity state, expected 
profits entering period 2 are: 
   Π     1 α   θH  VH  w    δ E Π     θ LB  
=  1 α  θH  δ   1 α  θH               1      1    1           .   (12) 
Ceteris paribus, expected profits are reduced by the severance mandate to the extent the 
worker collects the severance upon departure from the firm, which would not occur if the 
worker (i) leaves voluntarily (quits) or (ii) attains “normal” retirement age (is not laid off in 
period 2 or 3). 
  Period 1 (The Hiring Period) 
The firm will hire workers only if expected profits are nonnegative, presumably in the 
first period high demand state only.  With positive fixed recruitment and training costs (h0): 
   Π     VH  w    δ E Π    h    0         (13) 
In this case (no change in layoff behavior), expected profits over the contract life to the firm 
are: 
   Π     VH  w    δ E Π    h   
     1 δ  1 α  θH    δ 1 α  θH           h  B   h     (14) 
where the severance induced expected gross hiring costs (h(B)) are: 
          δ  1 α  θL    δ 1 α    θHθL B   (15) 
This reflects the expected severance expenditures under the program and is essentially the 
Heckman and Pagés (2004) model.  From Equation (15) one can derive: 
Proposition 2:  The hiring costs associated with severance benefit mandates 
increase with the discount factor and the likelihood of layoff and decrease with the 
likelihood of voluntary (uninsured) attrition. 
Presumably competition would force up the “competitive wage” to the zero expected profit 
point, or: 
           
       
         H         H         (16)   11
Productivity in the high demand state must exceed wages by the amortized cost of 
recruitment costs and expected severance related hiring costs.
19 
B. Layoff  avoidance 
If mandated benefits are sufficiently large (relative to the low demand productivity), 
they will induce layoff avoidance--the firm will retain workers on the payroll in the low 
demand state.  By backward induction: 
Period 3 (Layoff Period 2) 
The layoff algorithm is the same as above.  If benefits are sufficiently large, the layoff 
condition will not be met and the firm will optimally retain workers in the low demand state: 
            . 
in which case expected third period profits become: 
   Π     1                               (17) 
Expected profits must be higher than those in Equation (9), or the firm would simply lay the 
worker off. 
Period 2 (Layoff Period 1) 
As earlier the layoff decision rule in period 2 is defined by the net cost of retaining the worker 
relative to releasing her, so that the firm will retain the worker in the low demand state if: 
              Π      B , or 
If this holds, then retention in the third period holds as well, and the expected value of period 
3 profits is now defined by Equation (17), not by Equation (10), so: 
             1                                 B , or 
             1                  B    1               . 
Recall that          0 .  Knowing that it will retain the worker in the third period, second 
period firing costs become: 
       B    1               .          (18) 
                                                 
19  Recall that the labor demand curve is perfectly elastic, so that the workers preferences over 
severance benefits affect equilibrium employment but not total compensation.  Mandated (expected) 
expenditures on severance benefits force down wages dollar for dollar in this model.  See below, 
Section VIII.   12
Note that second period firing costs will be higher if the firm is expected to retain the worker 
in the low demand state in the next period than if it expects to lay them off (Equation 9a):  
The “adjustment” factor is larger (less negative) if retention implies higher profits: 
    1                1       . 
A layoff now means a lesser reduction in future severance liabilities. 
Proposition 3:  If it is optimal to retain cohort 3 workers in the low demand state, 
potential firing costs for the period 2 cohort is higher--the reduction in future 
severance liabilities is less—and the likelihood of layoff in period 2 drops. 
With retention in both years, expected profits on the contract entering period 2 are: 
   Π     1 α   θH VH  w    θ L VL  w    δ E Π    
   1 α   1   δ 1   α  θH VH  w    θ L VL  w   .     (19) 
Ceteris paribus, expected profits are (i) increased relative to the alternative regime in which 
the workers were laid off, but (ii) reduced relative to the zero mandate regime, because the 
firm is induced to retain a worker on the payroll who would in the absence of the mandate be 
laid off.   
  Period 1 (The Hiring Period) 
Again the firm will hire workers only if expected profits are nonnegative.  With positive 
fixed recruitment and training costs (h0): 
   Π     VH  w    δ E Π    h   
     1 δ  1 α  θH    δ 1 α  θH            
       δ 1 α  θL    δ 1 α    θHθL  VL  w   h   
     1 δ  1 α  θH    δ 1 α  θH           h  B   h   (20) 
where the severance-induced expected gross hiring costs (h(B)) are: 
          δ  1 α  θL    δ 1 α    θHθL  VL  w    .    (21) 
The severance-induced hiring costs are the costs of “carrying” workers in the low demand 
states when the firm would otherwise lay them off minus the expected gain in period three if 
high demand returns.  At sufficiently high severance benefits, the firm retains workers in the 
low demand state and avoids benefit payouts entirely; further increases in benefit mandates   13
generate no additional distortions.  Although an obvious implication of the fact that expected 
profits are higher if retention in the low demand state is profit maximizing, for completeness: 
Proposition 4:  If it is optimal to retain cohort 2 and/or 3 workers in the low demand 
state, hiring costs will be lower than if the workers were released and severance 
paid. 
Presumably competition would force up the “competitive wage” to the zero expected profit 
point, or: 
      
 
       
 
        
  
             ( 2 2 )  
where   1 δ  1 α  θH    δ 1 α  θH   and   δ  1 α  θL    δ 1 α    θHθL. 
VI.  A Severance Mandate with Contractual Avoidance (Severance Savings) 
 
The firm is made worse off by the severance (insurance) mandate, at least in the 
short run, though its losses might be limited by strategic reductions in layoffs in the low 
demand state, particularly in the second period.  That said, the firm may do better by 
converting the insurance mandate into a savings plan by offering a supplementary benefit 
package. 
Consider the impact on firing costs and hiring costs of a promise by the firm to pay 
the worker B if the worker leaves voluntarily or at retirement as well as at layoff.  Because 
the firm will now be offering retirement benefits (to those who remain with the firm throughout 
their work lives, the fourth (4
th) period must be considered.  For simplicity, consider the case 
with no layoff avoidance and proceed by backward induction.   
Period 4 (Retirement) 
Assume all workers pass into retirement following period 3.
20  Entering the retirement 
period, expected profits in period 4 are now: 
    Π     B .         ( 2 3 )  
Period 3 (Layoff period 2) 
As before the firm will lay off the worker in the low demand state in period 3 if net expected 
profits conditional on layoff are higher than if the worker is retained: 
                                                 
20  As everywhere above, mortality risk is ignored here.   14
  (           Π         
  (            1         s o        ( 2 4 )  
             1           ( 2 5 )  
Note EQ25: If δ=1, firing costs in period 3 are zero and the layoff rule reduces to the 
“no severance” rule, Equation (1).  More generally firing costs are zero in the savings 
model if the severance promise accrues interest between periods, so that       
 
   , for t = 2 and 3. 
If workers are laid off in the low demand state in period 3, expected profits at the beginning 
of period 3 are: 
   Π             1                    Π               
     1                    1                .   (26) 
Note EQ26: again: if δ=1, the coefficient on the second term in Equation (19), namely 
     1              , reduces to -1. 
Period 2 (Layoff Period 1) 
The firm will lay off workers in period 2 in the low demand state if: 
              Π        . 
               1                    1                      . 
             1                         1                . (27) 
so that 
                      1               .     (28) 
The left hand side of the inequality in (27) remains unchanged—the low demand state net 
productivity plus the discounted expected value of a better demand state in period 3.   
Note EQ28: The right hand side, the layoff penalty in the second period, is again zero 
if the firm discount factor is one, or if benefits are increased by the firm’s interest rate 
between periods. 
With layoffs in the low productivity state in the second period, expected profits entering 
period 2 are: 
   Π             1                    Π               
      1            1               
           1          1                   1         . (29) 
    15
Period 1 (The Hiring Period) 
At the time of hire, the worker presumably has non-negative expected value to the firm: 
    Π     VH  w    δ  Π    h    0 . 
In this case of no layoff avoidance, the expected value over the contract life to the firm is: 
   Π     1 δ  1 α  θH    δ  1 α  θH    VH  w    
          1   θH α  1 α   δθH  θ L      1 α  θL B h   
   Π     1 δ  1 α  θH    δ  1 α  θH    VH  w   h  B   h     (30) 
where  
                1    θH α  1 α   δθH  θ L      1 α  θL B      (31) 
Note EQ31:  If δ=1 (or benefits are interest rate adjusted between periods), then 
        , the mandate insures the worker will receive the severance benefit some 
day. 
Summarizing: 
Proposition 5:  The substitution of a severance savings plan for a severance 
insurance plan will reduce firing costs and eliminate them if payments are 
appropriately adjusted for time of payment, but will increase hiring costs. 
The “competitive wage” at zero expected profit, would simply reflect the payout: 
            
       
         H         H         (32) 
VII.  The Firing Cost/Hiring Cost Interface 
Severance-induced firing costs and hiring costs are quite distinct, and depend in 
different ways on characteristics of the labor market.  The connections are not always 
transparent.  Consider for example the firing cost and hiring cost measures in the mandate 
model in which the firm does not engage in first order (layoff) avoidance:
21 
                 1         1   1       .     (11) 
          δ  1 α  θL    δ 1 α    θHθL B     (15) 
Mandated severance benefits, of course, have the same qualitative effects on firing costs 
and hiring costs—higher benefits increase firing costs and gross hiring costs.  Other 
parametric shifts often move the two measures in opposite directions.  Indeed contract 
                                                 
21 The same qualitative pattern of effects holds in the model with layoff avoidance, Equations (18) and 
(21).   16
avoidance behaviors such as the conversion of a severance insurance mandate to a 
severance savings plan offers the firm a tradeoff between the two types of costs.   
Table 1 summarizes the comparative statics of various parametric changes to firing 
costs and hiring costs.  The impact of a severance mandate varies with the economic 
environment.  For example, an increase in the attrition or quit rate (α) has an intuitive, 
negative effect on expected gross hiring costs.  Because voluntary departures are not 
covered in severance insurance mandates, an increase in quit rates reduces expected 
expenditures.  The effect on firing costs is perhaps less intuitive.  The firm’s net cost of a 
layoff depends not only on the current expenditure that it is required to make, but also on 
changes in its future liabilities.  An increase in (uncovered) quit rates decreases the 
likelihood the worker will receive severance benefits in the future, which in turn makes the 
expected cost of a current layoff greater. 
Similarly the impact of a higher likelihood of a low demand state (θL) increases hiring 
costs and decreases firing costs.  The impact on hiring costs is straightforward.  Realization 
of the low demand state is the insured event, and increasing its likelihood will increase 
expected payouts from the insurance plan.  At the time of potential release, however, firing 
costs are less because the firm appreciates that it has a greater probability of paying out 
benefits in future periods if it does not lay off the worker today.  In the extreme, the firm 
“knows” it will be paying out severance at some point and, discounting issues aside, has no 
reason to delay the inevitable payout.  This can happen in severance insurance plans as 
well as severance savings plans if the probability of covered (involuntary) separations 
approach one.
22  As the payout probability grows, the severance insurance plan approaches 
a severance savings plan. 
The discount factor, one over the sum of one plus the discount rate), offers a slightly 
different story, but only slightly.  A higher discount factor (δ) means the firm values the future 
more completely.  The severance-induced hiring cost measure increases as a consequence, 
because hiring takes place in the present, and negative demand draws (and related benefit 
                                                 
22  See Parsons (2011a) for examples.   17
payouts) in the future.  Firing costs will decrease, however.  The benefit expenditure is in the 
present and undiscounted.  Future severance liabilities, which will be reduced with a payout 
today, are discounted and will be less in expectation.  The effect is to reduce net firing costs. 
To give a better sense of the potential magnitudes of these effects and their 
complexity, consider the following simulation of second period firing costs and (first period) 
hiring costs.  Assume a base structure for this three-period employment model in which the 
government would like to insure that the worker receives a severance benefit of B=100 
whenever she is forced to leave the job.   This could be achieved by mandating the obvious 
severance insurance plan or a severance savings plan which pays out B=100 whenever the 
worker leaves the firm and for whatever reason--involuntary, voluntary, or retirement.  There 
would still be nonzero firing cost effects with severance savings if the discount factor is less 
than one, reflecting the fact that the firm has some incentive to delay payout, but would be 
zero if the discount factor is one (payouts are interest adjusted).  The hiring costs effect 
would be the discounted likelihood of separation in each of the three work periods and would 
simply equal 100 if the firm’s discount factor is 1. 
To fill out the parameters of the base model, assume that   0 . 7 ,   0 . 3 ,          
0.5 and again     100. In the severance insurance plan in this base case, firing costs are 
now 75.5 and severance induced hiring costs are 30.5.  Under the savings plan in the base 
environment, second period firing costs are 37.35 and severance-induced hiring costs are 
60.9.  Firing costs are not zero when the discount factor is 0.7 and benefits are fixed across 
periods, because the firm gains significantly by postponing benefit payout. 
Returning to the severance insurance plan, outcomes respond dramatically to 
variations in the underlying parameters, Table 2.  For example, increasing natural attrition 
(α) from 0.0 to 1.0, while holding other parameters constant, increases firing costs from 65 to 
100 while decreasing hiring costs from 47.2 to 0.0.  Again, if the worker will exit with certainty 
in the next period without incurring severance benefit eligibility, the employer “saves” the   18
entire benefit payout by retaining the worker in this period, dramatically increasing firing 
costs.   
Varying the probability of a low demand period (θL) from 0.0 to 1.0 has the opposite 
effect.  Firing costs approach 100 as the prospects of a bad draw in the next period 
approach zero, and fall by one half (to 51) if the prospects of a bad demand draw in the next 
period are one.  Even if the probability of a bad draw in the next period is zero, the employer 
may avoid payout because of natural attrition (and the discount rate in nonzero).  Conversely 
hiring costs increase with the likelihood of a low demand state, because payout prospects 
increase. 
The discount factor (δ) operates on firing costs and hiring costs much like low 
demand probability (θL), increasing hiring cost as future severance benefits are less severely 
discounted.  Firing costs decrease as the discount factor increases because the “returns” to 
postponement of a layoff fall as the discount factor rises. 
VIII.  Service-based Severance Mandates 
Mandated severance benefits typically vary with years of service or tenure, often as a 
simple multiple.  In a comprehensive study of national mandates of job separation benefits, 
Holzmann, Pouget, Weber, and Vodopivec (2011) reported on the benefit payouts at 9 
months, 4 years, and 20 years.   Of eighty countries with valid entries at four years and 
twenty years, only 14 (17.5 percent), primarily successor states to the Soviet Union, 
mandated flat benefits.  The ratio of benefits at twenty years to those at four years ranged 
from one (the 14 states just mentioned) to ten (Albania, Ecuador, and Malawi), Figure 1.  
The modal ratio of benefits at twenty years to those at four was a factor of five, implying that 
benefits increase in proportion to service.  A total of 26 countries (32.5 percent of the 
sample) reported exactly this figure, with several others quite close. 
Although voluntary severance plans in the U.S. are more varied, almost all have 
some element of benefits increasing in proportion to service, Parsons (2005).  Especially for 
blue collar and service workers and clerical workers, the modal plan offers one week of pay   19
per year of service, Parsons (2005).  Among upper level administrators, two weeks per year 
of service is common.  Only among senior executives are individually negotiated contracts 
the norm. 
Pagés and Montenegro (2007) raised a potentially important policy concern with 
service-linked severance mandates--that younger workers would be disadvantaged, the first 
on the firm’s layoff queue, because of the higher firing costs associated with older, longer-
service workers.
23  The present model, suitably modified, lets us explore this issue, although 
it, like the related model of Pagés and Montenegro (2007), is not ideal for analyzing this 
question because there is no possibility of substitution between members of different 
employment cohorts.  Taken literally, the model can only be used to assess whether the 
range of parameters over which layoffs will occur is larger or smaller for the various cohorts.  
If the range of layoff parameters is made smaller by a policy for one employment cohort than 
another, we will say that that cohort is favored by the policy.  
If one wishes to design severance pay policies that are neutral across generational 
cohorts, one has to specify the objective more precisely.  Two distinct alternatives are: 
(i)  make policies neutral across the cohorts, or 
(ii)  more ambitiously, equate layoff incentives across the cohorts. 
As noted above, the young in this model are “naturally” favored in the second period, 
because retained second period (young) workers may be profitable to the firm in the next 
period should demand recover, a possibility denied older workers in their terminal period in 
the labor market.  Either objective can be achieved, though not with flat rate plans. 
.  First consider the flat severance benefit regime developed to this point.  To highlight 
the role of benefits, assume that layoff avoidance is absent.  Firing costs for the two cohorts 
then are: 
Period 3 Cohort:              .       (8) 
Period 2 Cohort:               1       .     (11) 
                                                 
23  Labor union contracts often mandate first-in first-out layoff policies independent of price incentives, 
no doubt partly the consequence of the greater voting power of senior workers.   20
Firing costs in the second period are systematically less because a layoff in period 2 
releases the firm from paying the worker benefits in period 3, which the firm can expect with 
positive probability.  It is transparent that flat rate benefit scheme cannot secure equal 
benefit-linked firing costs across hiring cohorts because the coefficient on benefits on the 
RHS of (10) is everywhere smaller in magnitude than that in (8).   
Proposition 6:  A flat rate severance benefit scheme cannot be policy neutral across 
cohorts.  The period 2 cohort will have lower firing costs at any level of B. 
A flat rate system can however be used to equalize the layoff likelihood in total.  Although 
firing costs are smaller for the Period 2 cohort, expected operating losses from retaining a 
member of the Period 2 cohort is also less.  Consider the layoff algorithm for the two cohorts 
in a low demand state: 
Period 3 Cohort:             .       (7) 
Period 2 Cohort:             1                  1   1       . (10) 
One need only increase benefits to the point that they offset the natural advantage of the 
younger cohort: 
    
  
  
       . 
The more obvious policy target is to neutralize the severance mandate effect only, 
and to do that it is necessary to vary benefits with service.  The layoff decision rules for the 
two cohorts when the severance benefit varies across cohorts are: 
Period 3 Cohort:                      ( 7 ’ )  
Period 2 Cohort:             1                        1            (10’) 
and the corresponding firing cost vectors (B2, B3): 
Period 3 Cohort:          .        .      (8’) 
Period 2 Cohort:        .            1       .     (11’) 
Clearly it is now possible to adjust benefits in such a way that the impact of the mandate on 
firing costs would be neutral across cohorts.  It Is only necessary that: 
        1    1          .   21
Because the coefficient on B3 is greater than one, it must be that the firing-cost-neutral 
benefit structure requires that B2 exceed B3—severance benefits should decrease in 
generosity with seniority.   
Proposition 7  A firing cost neutral severance insurance plan requires that benefits 
decrease with the worker’s service with the firm.   
It is simple to move beyond making the mandate policy-neutral, and design a benefit 
structure that equates layoff prospects between cohorts, essentially offsetting the natural 
advantages of youth in this model.  Increasing third period benefits (B3) will discourage third 
period layoffs while making second period layoffs more likely, and it is transparent that a 
sufficiently large severance mandate in period 3 (B3) will have the firm laying off younger 
workers more freely than older workers.   
Indeed one can imagine a benefit schedule with benefits for the third period cohort so 
high that firms would systematically lay off all workers in the second period independent of 
demand state, to avoid accruing the additional severance liability.
24  The mandate schedule 
might induce the firm to operate with short-service workers despite underlying incentives, in 
this case recruiting costs, to operate with long-service workers.  The popularity of temporary 
contract workers in some severance-mandating countries suggests that firms do make such 
calculations, OECD (2004). 
In all these calculations, however, one must recognize the upper bound on 
severance benefit effects.  The discussion has focused on the range of benefits that would 
not induce layoff avoidance.  Once benefits induce the firm to retain workers in the low 
demand state, additional benefit increments have no effect on firm behavior. 
IX. Conclusion 
Substantial severance (insurance) benefits would seem like a serious impediment to 
the efficient release of workers in low demand periods and even to new hires in high demand 
periods, and it is natural to ask why the empirical record provides no evidence of either.  A 
                                                 
24  Prior to ERISA, when cliff-vesting was common, for example pensions vesting only with thirty years 
of service, the claim was often made that firms strategically released workers at 29 years of service. 
For a review of the pre-ERISA world of pensions, see Thompson (2005).   22
three period employment model is used to derive formal measures of firing costs and hiring 
costs to explore this issue.  These are employed to clarify the impact of mandated severance 
plans on major employment decisions.  The model reveals that firing costs are generally less 
than severance benefit levels, and perhaps sharply less.  The linkage between severance 
benefit generosity and “firing costs” depends on a variety of factors, including voluntary 
separation rates and the likelihood of future (covered) involuntary separations, most of which 
dampen any labor market response. 
Moreover firing costs do not translate in any simple way into hiring costs and 
therefore new hires.  Severance insurance benefits may be large but rarely paid out, if, for 
example, most hires reach normal retirement with the firm; hiring costs are correspondingly 
low.  Conversely firing costs would be high in this case, approaching severance benefit 
levels.  Contractual avoidance of firing cost effects by converting a severance insurance plan 
into a severance savings plan reduces firing costs even as it increases gross hiring costs. 
The bulk of the paper employs a fixed benefit mandate, but extends simply to a more 
realistic service or tenure linked benefit structure.  The broader model is used to confront a 
policy concern raised by Pagés and Montenegro (2007)--that severance mandates 
increasing in service may induce firms to layoff younger workers disproportionately.  The 
model permits design of a cohort-neutral severance mandate of unexpected structure.   23
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TABLE 1 
COMPARATIVE STATICS OF  
SEVERANCE-INDUCED FIRING AND HIRING COSTS 
 
  Firing Costs Gross Hiring Costs 
    
Severance Benefits (B)  + + 
Attrition (Quit) Rate (α)  + - 
Probability of Low Demand State (θL) - + 
Firm Discount Factor (δ)  - + 
   27
TABLE 2 
FIRING COST AND HIRING COST SIMULATIONS 
BENCHMARK    
        
  B  α  θL δ FC2(B) HC(B) 
        
  100  0.3 0.5 0.7 75.50 30.50 
        
ALPHA    
  B  α  θL δ FC2(B) HC(B) 
    
  100  0 0.5 0.7 65.00 47.25 
  100  0.1 0.5 0.7 68.50 41.42 
  100  0.2 0.5 0.7 72.00 35.84 
  100  0.3 0.5 0.7 75.50 30.50 
  100  0.4 0.5 0.7 79.00 25.41 
  100  0.5 0.5 0.7 82.50 20.56 
  100  0.6 0.5 0.7 86.00 15.96 
  100  0.7 0.5 0.7 89.50 11.60 
  100  0.8 0.5 0.7 93.00 7.49 
  100  0.9 0.5 0.7 96.50 3.62 
  100  1 0.5 0.7 100.00 0.00 
    
THETA L         
  B  α  θL δ FC2(B) HC(B) 
        
  100  0.3 0 0.7 100 0 
  100  0.3 0.1 0.7 95.10 7.06 
  100  0.3 0.2 0.7 90.20 13.64 
  100  0.3 0.3 0.7 85.30 19.74 
  100  0.3 0.4 0.7 80.40 25.36 
  100  0.3 0.5 0.7 75.50 30.50 
  100  0.3 0.6 0.7 70.60 35.16 
  100  0.3 0.7 0.7 65.70 39.34 
  100  0.3 0.8 0.7 60.80 43.04 
  100  0.3 0.9 0.7 55.90 46.26 
  100  0.3 1 0.7 51.00 49.00 
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TABLE 2 (CONTINUED) 
DELTA    
  B  α  θL δ FC2(B) HC(B) 
        
  100  0.3 0.5 0 100.00 0.00 
  100  0.3 0.5 0.1 96.50 3.62 
  100  0.3 0.5 0.2 93.00 7.49 
  100  0.3 0.5 0.3 89.50 11.60 
  100  0.3 0.5 0.4 86.00 15.96 
  100  0.3 0.5 0.5 82.50 20.56 
  100  0.3 0.5 0.6 79.00 25.41 
  100  0.3 0.5 0.7 75.50 30.50 
  100  0.3 0.5 0.8 72.00 35.84 
  100  0.3 0.5 0.9 68.50 41.42 
  100  0.3 0.5 1 65.00 47.25   29
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